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Through international agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change1 and the Kyoto Protocol2 the global community has acknowledged 
that climate change is a global problem and sought to achieve reductions in global 
emissions, within a sufficient timeframe, to avoid dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. The sheer magnitude of emissions reductions 
required within such an urgent timeframe presents a challenge to conventional 
regulatory approaches both internationally and within Australia. The phenomenon of 
climate change is temporally and geographically challenging and it is scientifically 
complex and uncertain.  The purpose of this paper is to analyse the current Australian 
legal response to climate change and to examine the legal measures which have been 
proposed to promote carbon trading, energy efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon 
sequestration initiatives across Australia. As this paper illustrates, the current 
Australian approach is clearly ineffective and the law as it stands overwhelmingly 
inadequate to address Australia’s emissions and meet the enormity of the challenges 
posed by climate change. Consequently, the government should look towards a more 
effective legal framework to achieve rapid and urgent transformations in the selection 
of energy sources, energy use and sequestration initiatives across the Australian 
community.   
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31 ILM 849 (entered into force on 21 March 1994) (the UNFCCC). 
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1. Background to the Australian Legal Response 
 
 
Australia is an energy intensive economy with the highest per capita emissions in the 
OECD.3 Australia’s largest and fastest growing source of emissions comes from 
energy use, the majority of which is fuelled by non-renewable fuels such as coal.4  
The agriculture and forests sectors are also significant and are responsible for 
approximately 23 per cent of Australia’s total emissions.5  Australia signed the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1998. Australia was one of only three nations granted an increase, rather 
than a decrease, in its reported 1990 greenhouse gas emissions for the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and was allocated a target of maintaining 
its emissions at 108 per cent of 1990 levels.6  All Annex-1 parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, including Australia, are also able to account for their emissions and 
sequestrations from national human induced land use change and forestry activities, 
since 1990, in calculating their emissions.7 Australia was also successful in 
negotiating the inclusion of the so-called ‘Australia clause’ in the Kyoto Protocol 
which permits net emissions from land use change and forestry to be included in the 
calculation of the 1990 emissions baseline.8 This includes land clearing which, prior 
to the first commitment period, was a major source of Australia’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.9  Australia has since enacted strict controls on widespread land clearing 
across Australia with associated reductions in land clearing emissions.10 
Despite these concessions, following the withdrawal of support for the Kyoto 
Protocol by the United States of America (US), the Australian Federal Government 
announced that it would not ratify any agreement to restrict emissions which excluded 
                                                 
3
  Garnaut Climate Change Review, 'Final Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory  
Governments of Australia' (2008),Chapter 7, 7.1. 
4
  Ibid. 
5
  Julia Gillard, ‘Carbon Farming Initiative’ (August 2010). Garnaut Review, Chapter 7.  
6
  The other nations granted an increase were Norway and Iceland. 
7
  This includes afforestation, reforestation and deforestation activities that have been measured as  
verifiable changes in carbon stocks. Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.3.  
8
  Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.7. This is significant given that Australia may emit up to 108 per cent of  
that calculated baseline. 
9
  Beeton RB et al, 'Australia State of the Environment 2006: Independent Report to the Australian  
Government Minister for the Environment and Heritage, Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, Canberra' (Australia State of the Environment Committee, 2006) at 28. 
10
  For example, in Queensland under the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld). 
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developing countries and the US.11 Australia’s ongoing political position remained 
that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol unless, and until, it was in the national 
interest to do so. The then Prime Minister asserted that, due to Australia’s special 
position as an emissions-intensive economy, the Kyoto Protocol would cost jobs and 
damage Australian industry.12 Despite this decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
the Federal Government continually reaffirmed its policy commitment to meet the 
108 per cent target under the Kyoto Protocol on a voluntary basis.13  Until 2008, the 
Australian Government focused primarily on the use of voluntary initiatives and 
policies to address climate change and meet its international climate change 
obligations.  Australia’s climate change policy was based on a ‘no-regrets’ approach 
with the Federal Government implementing only those measures which had no net 
costs, or other net benefits, besides limiting greenhouse emissions or conserving or 
enhancing greenhouse sinks.14 Indeed, in 1996, an Australian bureaucrat was 
controversially quoted as announcing that it would be more cost efficient to evacuate 
nearby small island nations threatened by rising sea levels than to obtain reductions in 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions.15 Accordingly, the Australian Government’s 
approach to emission reductions relied heavily on voluntary cooperative partnerships 
between industry and government through initiatives such as the Greenhouse 
Challenge and Greenhouse Challenge Plus schemes and the Greenhouse Friendly 
voluntary offsets scheme. 16   
 
 
                                                 
11
  Planet Ark, ‘World’s Biggest Coal Exporter Australia Dumps Kyoto’ (6 June 2002, Australia),  
<http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/16298/story.htm> .  
12
  Prime Minister John Howard, Representatives, 5 June 2002, Answers to Questions Without  
Notice, 3163. See also Australian Greenhouse Office, June 1999, National Emissions Trading,  
Issuing the Permits, Discussion Paper No.2, Chapter 5 at 45. 
13
  Department of the Environment and Heritage, 'Tracking to the Kyoto Target 2006: Australia's  
Greenhouse Emissions Trends 1990 to 2008-2012 and 2020' (Australian Greenhouse Office,  
2006), 3. 
14
  Sullivan R, Rethinking Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy, (Edward Elgar, UK, 2005)  
p104; Sullivan R, 'Greenhouse Challenge Plus: a new departure or more of the same?' (2006)  
23(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 60 at 61; Australian Greenhouse Office, The  
National Greenhouse Strategy (Australian Greenhouse Office, 1998). 
15
  Bita N, ‘Island Evacuations a Greenhouse Solution’ The Weekend Australian 8-9 June 1996 p 8. 
16
  Sullivan R, 'Greenhouse Challenge Plus: a new departure or more of the same?' (2006) 23(1)  
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 60 at 60. 
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2. The Carbon Trading Debate in Australia 
 
For many years, the Australian Federal Government remained firm on its objection to 
emissions trading in Australia stating that, ‘Australia will not impose significant new 
economy-wide costs, such as emissions trading … Pursuing this path in advance of an 
effective global response would harm Australia's competitiveness and growth with no 
certain climate change benefits’.17 However, the Australian State and Territory 
Governments saw potential in establishing a carbon trading scheme. In 2004, the 
National Emissions Trading Taskforce (NETT) proposed a national, State-based, cap 
and trade system.18 Coverage of the scheme extended from the stationary energy 
sector to the transport sector, industrial process emissions and fugitive emissions.19 It 
was proposed that permits would take the form of property rights with the free 
allocation of permits to electricity generators and emissions-intensive-trade-exposed 
industries (EITEs).20 Although supported by all State and Territory Governments the 
proposal was undermined by the absence of support from the Federal Government.  
In December 2006, Prime Minister Howard responded to community pressure by 
establishing a Task Group on Emissions Trading.21 The group was directed to consider 
a proposal for Australia to establish a workable global emissions trading system in 
which Australia would participate. The Task Group made recommendations for the 
implementation of an Australian domestic emissions trading scheme with the 
potential to link to other overseas trading schemes in the future.22  Emissions reduction 
liabilities were to be imposed on large scale users of fossil fuels and fossil fuel 
distributors in Australia. The system was intended to become operational by the end 
of 2011. The key features of the emissions trading scheme were to be announced in 
                                                 
17
  Australian Government Energy Task Force, 'Securing Australia's Energy Future' (Department of  
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2004) at 25. 
18
  National Emissions Trading Taskforce,‘Possible design for a national greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme: final framework report on scheme design’ (NETT, December  
2007). 
19
  Ibid. 
20
  Ibid. 
21
  Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, 'Report of the Task Group on Emissions  
Trading' (The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2007) pp 9, 85. 
22
  Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, 'Report of the Task Group on Emissions  
Trading' (The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2007) pp 9, 85. 
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mid-2008 including, crucially, the long term emissions reduction target.23  However, 
work on this proposal ceased following the change of government in 2007. 
Climate change became a key issue in the 2007 election as the Australian 
community began to question the absence of action to address the emerging impacts 
of climate change. The Howard Government accepted that some response to climate 
change was required and introduced a national greenhouse gas emissions reporting 
framework intended to operate in conjunction with the proposed future national 
emissions trading system.24  The National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 
(Cth)(NGER) is still in effect and requires corporations which emit above specific 
thresholds to report on their greenhouse gas emissions and energy use through a 
national register.25  This Act is largely administrative in nature and merely requires 
reporting of levels of emissions. No substantive duty is created by this legislation to 
require steps to be taken to reduce those reported levels of emissions.26   
The Rudd Government was elected in 2007 with promises to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, address climate change (or as it called it - the greatest moral challenge of 
our time) and introduce a mechanism to place a price on carbon and reduce 
emissions. The Rudd Government came to the conclusion that Australia’s mitigation 
costs were higher than most developed economies due to its large share of emissions 
intensive industries and that international trade in carbon permits would reduce the 
cost of Australia’s mitigation efforts.27  Significant emphasis was placed by the 
government on a Federal emissions trading scheme as the primary means for 
regulating greenhouse gases in Australia. Consequently, following the subsequent 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Australia in late 2007, a significant shift in 
                                                 
23
  Ibid, 144. 
24
  Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, 'Report of the Task Group on Emissions  
Trading' (The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2007). 
25
  The thresholds are set out in the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth),  
section 13. The obligation to report commenced on 1 July 2008 with the first report due in October  
2009.   
26
  The Australian Coalition has indicated that it would build upon this reporting structure to  
implement its proposed emissions reduction incentive scheme by which abatement above a  
businesses reported NGER emissions (business as usual levels) would be purchased by the  
Coalition Government. The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and  
Climate Change’ 2010. 
27
  Australian Government, 'Australia’s Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change  
Mitigation’(Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) at 137. 
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government climate change policy and law was expected.  
 
 
3. Features of the Proposed Australian Carbon Trading Scheme 
 
A Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) was proposed by the Rudd 
Government in 2008 with an expected start date of 2010. In 2009, the government 
announced that the commencement of the scheme would be delayed to mid-2011 
owing to concerns regarding the impacts of the global recession on Australia’s 
economy. However the CPRS has not been well received and has been the subject of 
intense debate and ongoing criticism regarding the adoption of low emission 
reductions goals, the large number of free permits awarded, the use of price caps and 
the disproportionate costs to be opposed on Australian business for relatively small 
scale emission reductions.  
The Rudd Government made a policy commitment of reducing Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions by 60 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050 with a relatively 
low interim target of achieving five per cent of those reductions by 2020.
28
  Those 
targets were not legislatively grounded and caps for the proposed emissions trading 
scheme were not announced. The government later released a set of conditional 
emissions reduction targets for 2020,
29
 dependent on the achievement of international 
agreement post-2012, of 15 per cent below 2000 levels
30
; or of 25 per cent below 
2000 levels.
31
 Both of these commitments were dependant on the inclusion of the land 
sector, including soil carbon and forests, and reduced emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD), as part of the international climate change 
                                                 
28
  Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, ‘Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol’ (3 December 2007, Media Statement).  
29
  Australian Government, Prime Minister, Treasurer, Minister for Climate Change and Water, ‘A 
New Target for Reducing Australia’s Carbon Pollution’ (May 2009) 
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/minister/wong/2009/media-releases/May/mr20090504c.aspx>. 
30
  If international agreement were reached where advanced economies reduce, in aggregate, in the 
 range of 15-25 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and major developing economies adopt  
substantive, measurable, reportable and verifiable commitments. 
31
  If comprehensive global action were taken capable of stabilising emissions at 450 ppm or lower.  
This includes advanced economy reductions, in aggregate, of at least 25 per cent below 1990  
levels by 2020 and major developing economy commitments with a collective reduction of at least  
20 per cent below business as usual by 2020. 
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agreement.  
  There are several flaws in the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).  One 
is the omission of any prohibition or restriction on the emissions of greenhouse gases 
to the atmosphere. This sits is in stark contrast to the approaches under the other 
overseas schemes.  Under the CPRS, covered entities are merely required to surrender 
allowances for each financial year’s emissions in the following year.32  The CPRS 
proposes to include all greenhouse gases included under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Emissions from industrial processes, stationary energy, domestic transport, waste, and 
oil and gas fugitive sources would be covered.33  Liable entities under the CPRS are 
those entities whose direct emissions number above 25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide 
for facilities under their operational control as well as persons who import, produce 
or supply fuel.
34
   
There is a large loophole in the design of the CPRS which enables entities to 
import unlimited eligible international units and surrender these in compliance with 
their duties under the CPRS.  The effect of this is to inflate the so-called emissions 
reduction ‘cap’ for the market and prevent any certainty from emerging as to the 
quantitative emissions reductions, if any, to be achieved by the scheme. It would also 
prevent the market from setting an appropriate price on carbon and influencing 
business as usual emitting behaviours.  
Another controversial aspect of the carbon trading scheme is the question of 
transitional assistance for emissions-intensive-trade-exposed industries (EITEs) 
through the issue of free or subsidised allowances.35 The Rudd Government 
determined that certain EITEs would be constrained in their ability to pass on the 
price of permits to their consumers and that transitional assistance was warranted.
36
 
                                                 
32
  CPRS, Part 6. 
33
  CPRS, Part 3. 
34
   Ibid.  
35
  The Australian Garnaut Review warned against the ‘arbitrary nature’ of such assistance measures.  
Garnaut Climate Change Review, 'Final Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory  
Governments of Australia' (2008), 317. 
36
  CPRS, Part 8. The proposed rate of assistance for moderately emissions-intensive activity (>1000t 
 CO2-e/$m is 60 per cent and 90 per cent for highly emissions intensive activity (>2000 tonnes  
CO2 -e/$m).  An additional Global Recession Buffer was proposed for the first five years of the  
scheme with an additional 5 per cent of free permits for activities eligible for 90 per cent  
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Other assistance measures were contemplated for the coal mining and coal-fired 
electricity generation sectors.
37
 The Greens Party was particularly scathing of these 
free allocations of permits, describing it as akin to paying polluters to pollute.  
The Government also elected to place a price cap on the price of Australian 
emissions allowances in the early years of the CPRS to protect industry from any 
abrupt increases in the cost of permits.
38
 The provision of both of these concessions 
was criticised for the interference it would cause to the operation of the market in 
placing an appropriate price on carbon and achieving actual reductions in business as 
usual emissions. 
Legislation for the implementation of the CPRS was developed in 2008-2009 by 
the Rudd Government. However, the bills package was rejected by the Australian 
Senate on two separate occasions.
39
 This included the compromise version negotiated 
with the leader of the opposition, Malcolm Turnbull, who believed that action on 
climate change was in the public interest and who lost his position in a leadership 
challenge as a result. With Tony Abbott, a devout climate sceptic, as opposition 
leader the CPRS has been adamantly opposed on the basis that it would unnecessarily 
increase the cost of living, push major industry overseas, cost jobs and damage the 
Australian economy.
40
 The Coalition asserts that it can achieve the same emissions 
reductions, of 5 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, without new or increased taxes 
on Australian industry nor increased costs to Australian households using Australia’s 
plentiful ‘sun and soil’ to provide solar energy and sequester soil carbon.41 The 
Coalition proposes so-called ‘direct action’ including an Emissions Reduction Fund 
                                                                                                                                                 
assistance and an additional 10 per cent free permits for those eligible for 60 per cent assistance in  
year one of the scheme. Draft Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Regulations 2009 (Cth). 
37
  CPRS, Part 8a and Part 9. 
38
  Starting at $10 per tonne in 2011 and increasing to approx $40 per tonne (multiplied by the  
indexation factor) from 1 July 2012. CPRS, Part 4.  
The bills package was rejected by the Australian Senate on 13 August 2009 and 2 December 2009. 
A third attempt in May 2010 was abandoned prior to the Senate voting on the bills package owing 
to vocal opposition from both the Coalition and the Greens Party. The Rudd Government has not 
explained why it did not attempt to use these two rejections to trigger the double dissolution of 
both Houses of Parliament and the call of an early election as provided for by section 57 of the 
Australian Commonwealth Constitution. The Gillard Government went to the election with a 
commitment to stand by the use of market mechanisms and implement the CPRS in 2012/2013. 
40
  The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and Climate Change’ 2010. 
41
  The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and Climate Change’ 2010. 
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by which emissions abatement below business as usual emissions would be purchased 
by the government while businesses that emit above their ‘business as usual’ baseline 
would incur a proportionate financial penalty.
42
 Importantly, business as usual 
emissions would be permitted to continue without penalty.   
Unfortunately for the Rudd Government, the CPRS was also opposed by the 
Greens Party on the basis that the weak emission reduction targets and provision of 
high levels of assistance was grossly inadequate to address the threat of climate 
change. The Government chose not to negotiate amendments to the CPRS with the 
Greens Party despite the fact that the Greens MPs now hold the balance of power in 
the Australian Senate. The Australian Garnaut Review concluded that a well-designed 
emissions trading scheme had important advantages over other forms of policy 
intervention.43 However, it also made it clear that, ‘a carbon tax would be better than a 
heavily compromised emissions trading scheme’.44  This is a philosophy adopted by 
the Greens Party and it has called for the immediate introduction of a carbon levy on 
Australian industrial emitters, fixed at approximately $20 per tonne, as an interim 
measure while Australia transitions to a functional and effective emissions trading 
scheme.45 
Following the August 2010 election, and the prospect of a hung parliament for the 
first time in 70 years, it is impossible to surmise what Australia legal response to 
climate change will look like in the future. What is certain is that fierce political 
debate is likely to continue as to the reality of the threat of climate change, the 
credibility of the science, the emissions cuts required, and the economic implications 
of imposing a carbon pricing mechanism on the Australian community. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
  The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and Climate Change’ 2010. 
43
  Garnaut Climate Change Review, 'Final Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory  
Governments of Australia' (2008), xxiv. 
44
  Ibid. 
45
  The Australian Greens MPs, ‘Greens Propose Garnaut’s Interim Solution to Break CPRS  
Deadlock’ and ‘Interim Carbon Price: Proposal for a Transitional Carbon Pricing Mechanism’  
(January 2010) <http://greensmp.org.au>.  
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4. Promoting the Uptake of Renewable Energy Sources 
 
In addition to mechanisms which are intended to put a price on carbon, there is an 
equal need for an effective legal regime for the promotion of renewable energy 
sources in Australia. This is a fact acknowledged by the Australian Labor Party, the 
Coalition and the Greens. However, there are significant economic, social and legal 
barriers to the deployment of renewable energy generation. The key barrier is the 
higher cost of renewable generation compared to conventional, often subsidised, 
fossil fuel power generation.
46
  The use of mandatory renewable energy targets, in 
conjunction with trading mechanisms, is a popular legal tool intended to create 
demand for renewable energy and increase its market share.   
 
The Australian Federal Mandatory Renewable Energy Target Scheme (MRETS) 
commenced in April 2001.
47
 The scheme was said to represent the world’s first 
genuinely mandatory renewable energy target scheme.
48
 MRETS placed a legal 
liability on wholesale purchasers of electricity to contribute towards the generation of 
an additional 9,500 gigawatt hours (GWh) of new renewable energy by 2010.
49
 
MRETS required wholesale purchasers of electricity and large consumers to source a 
certain amount of their electricity from renewable energy sources through the annual 
surrender of renewable energy certificates (RECs).
50
 RECs were created by accredited 
generators for each whole megawatt hour of electricity generated from eligible 
renewable sources including hydro, biomass, wind, solar and co-firing of biomass in 
large coal-fired power stations
51
  Any shortfall in submitted annual RECS resulted in 
the imposition of a penalty per excess megawatt hour, set slightly above projected 
peak REC prices.
52
   
                                                 
46
  See Diesendorf M, Greenhouse Solutions with Sustainable Energy (University of New South  
Wales Press, Sydney, 2007). 
47
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 4. 
48
  Kent A and Mercer D, ‘Australia's Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET): an assessment’ 
 (2006) 34 Energy Policy 1046 at1049. Amounting to a 2 per cent target. 
49
  Australian Greenhouse Office, 'Renewable Energy Commercialisation in Australia' (AGO, 2003) 
 at vii. 
50
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss35,36. 
51
  MacGill I, Outhred H and Nolles K, 'Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas  
regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry' (2006) 34(1) Energy Policy 11 at 16. 
52
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cth). 
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A number of Australian States and Territories also implemented initiatives aimed 
at promoting the uptake of renewable energy by wholesale power purchasers.
53
  For 
example, the New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Program includes provisions for crediting of renewable energy.54  A 
similar initiative to MRET was also introduced under the Victorian Renewable 
Energy Target Scheme from January 2007.
55
  In 2009, legislative amendments were 
passed in the Australian Senate, after being ‘de-linked’ from the troubled CPRS bills 
package, to bring the MRET and existing State-based targets into a single national 
Renewable Energy Target scheme (RET) which would operate until 1 January 2031.
56
  
Under the national RET scheme, any person who has made a wholesale acquisition or 
notional wholesale acquisition of electricity during the year, is liable to surrender 
renewable energy certificates (RECs) for the required renewable energy for the year 
or pay the renewable energy shortfall charge.
57
 The required energy is calculated 
based on the amount of acquired energy and the renewable power percentage for the 
year.
58
  The expanded RET scheme requires 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity to be 
sourced from renewable sources by 2020 increasing the target to around 45,000 
gigawatt-hours in 2020.59 Emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) activities have 
received a partial exemption from the renewable energy shortfall charge.
60
 In contrast 
to the assistance offered under the carbon trading scheme, this was a reduction in 
liability rather than the issue of free tradeable credits. 
  An accredited power station can create a REC for each whole megawatt 
hour (MWh) of electricity generated by the power station during a year in excess of 
its 1997 eligible renewable power baseline.
61
  Eligible renewable energy sources 
include: hydro; wind; solar; geothermal; energy crops; waste; biomass; landfill gas; 
                                                 
53
  For example, see Electricity Act 1994 (QLD), Victorian Renewable Energy Act 2006 (Vic),  
Electricity Industry (Wind Energy Development) Act 2004 (Vic) and Climate Change and  
Greenhouse Emissions Reduction Act 2007 (SA). 
54
  Electricity Supply Act 1995 (NSW), Electricity (Greenhouse Gas Emissions) Act 2004 (ACT). 
55
  Victorian Renewable Energy Act 2006 (Vic) section 66. 
56
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 4. 
57
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss 31-38. 
58
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 39. 
59
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 40. 
60
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), Part 5, Division 1A. 
61
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 18. 
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and sewage gas.
62
  The RET was also controversially amended to extend to the use of 
waste coal mine gas, or coal seam gas, in the generation of electricity.63 The expanded 
RET also includes solar credits as a mechanism to boost support to the community. 
Solar Credits are provided in the form of RECs for eligible small-scale solar 
photovoltaic, wind and hydro electricity generation systems and solar water heaters 
installed or after 9 June 2009 for the first 1.5 kilowatts (kW) of capacity of the system 
installed.
64
  A multiplier of five would be applied to units installed between 9 June 
2009 and 30 June 2012 decreasing to a multiplier of two in July 2014.
65
  Each REC 
represents one MWh of electricity generated from a renewable source above the 
nominated baseline. This includes RECs issued as solar credits despite the fact that 
each REC does not represent the creation of one MWh of eligible renewable energy in 
that context.  
MRET has been criticised, in particular, for setting relatively low renewable 
energy targets and low baselines resulting in the creation of RECs without any real 
encouragement of new asset improvements or greater efficiency.
66
 Investment in 
renewable energy projects notably stalled once excess projects had been developed to 
meet the relatively modest 9,500 GWh target and companies began to move to 
overseas jurisdictions where there were more encouraging fiscal policies.
67
 MRET has 
been further criticised for over representation of hydro-generators in the renewables 
mix as these do not strictly produce ‘renewable’ energy owing to their reliance on the 
non-renewable resource of water.
68
  It has also been stated that many credited 
activities represent business as usual activities for project developers rather than an 
additional activity.69 The expanded RET has also faced difficulties including the 
significant drop in the price of certificates as large numbers of ‘solar credits’ flooded 
the market. In response to this, amendments were made to separate the scheme into 
                                                 
62
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 17. 
63
  This was provided as a transitional assistance measure until 31 December 2020. 
64
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), ss23A,23B 
65
  Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), section 23B. 
66
  Kent and Mercer, n48,1056. 
67
  Mortimore A, ‘An Evaluation of the Fiscal Mechanisms For Fostering Solar 
Energy in Australia’ in Cottrell J et al, Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International 
and Comparative Perspectives Volume VI (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p569. 
68
  Kent and Mercer, n48,1052. 
69
  Ibid. 
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two parts from 2011, namely, the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) and 
the Large-scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET).70  
The RET is considered by the Gillard Government to be a complementary 
measure to the proposed carbon reduction scheme. However, some consider its 
interaction with carbon trading to be an impediment, rather than as asset, making 
emissions reductions more costly for the Australian community. As noted forcefully 
in the Australian Garnaut Review, ‘no useful purpose is served by other policies that 
have as their rationale the reduction of emissions from sectors covered by the trading 
scheme. The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target should be phased out.’71  
The Coalition Party intends to increase the use of Australia’s solar power though 
incentive schemes and would continue a renewable energy scheme in the guise of the 
Clean Energy Target (CET) aimed at encouraging the uptake of low emissions 
technology.72 
 
5. Achieving Energy Efficiency in the Building Sector 
 
Achieving greater energy efficiency offers potentially significant reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions in Australia at low or negligible costs to energy users.
73
 
Commercial buildings account for at least ten per cent of Australia’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, excluding emissions associated with building and construction, and those 
emissions are reported to have grown by 87 per cent between 1990 and 2006.
74
 
In July 2009, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)75 signed the 
National Partnership Agreement on Energy Efficiency to deliver a nationally-
                                                 
70
  The legislation also included provisions to address the creation of excess RECS from small scale 
 renewable sources and to modify the solar credits multiplier.    
71
  Garnaut Climate Change Review, 'Final Report to the Commonwealth, State and Territory  
Governments of Australia' (2008) at xxxii.  
72
  The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and Climate Change’ 2010. 
73
  Australian Government, ‘The Private Cost Effectiveness of Improving Energy Efficiency’  
(Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 36, 31 August 2005) at xxi.  
74
  Australian Government, ‘National Framework for Energy Efficiency: Mandatory Disclosure of  
Commercial Office Building Energy Efficiency Regulation Document’ (Department of the 
Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, November 2009) at vii.  
75
  COAG is comprised of the Prime Minister of Australia, State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers  
and the President of the Australian Local Government Association. 
15 
 
consistent and cooperative approach to energy efficiency in Australia.
 76
  COAG also 
formally endorsed a ten year work plan designed to achieve a nationally consistent 
approach to energy efficiency through the National Strategy on Energy Efficiency 
which included: 
 development of a consistent outcomes-based national building energy standard 
setting, assessment and rating framework to be implemented from 2011.  
 significant increase of the stringency of energy efficiency provisions for commercial 
buildings in the Building Code of Australia (BCA).  
 increase of the stringency of energy efficiency provisions for all new residential 
buildings in the Building Code of Australia (BCA).  
 phase-in of obligations for mandatory disclosure of the energy efficiency of 
commercial  and residential buildings.
77
  
The Commonwealth Energy Efficiency Disclosure Scheme requires mandatory 
disclosure through a Building Energy Efficiency Certificate (BEEC) issued by the 
authority which states the energy efficiency rating for the building or relevant area; an 
assessment of the energy efficiency of the lighting; and the provision of general 
guidance on energy efficiency opportunities.
78
 The assessment of energy efficiency 
will be carried out by an accredited assessor.79   
The disclosure obligation applies to the offer, invitation of offers, sale, lease and 
sub-lease of existing commercial buildings or office areas of 2,000 m
2
 net lettable 
area or larger.
80
 A small number of transactions may be exempt from the scheme, 
including short-term leases of less than twelve months duration. In all other cases, 
disclosure will be required in any advertisement about the sale or lease and to 
prospective buyers and tenants.81  Civil penalties will apply for failure to comply with 
the Act.82 If the assessments are not properly carried out in accordance with the Act, 
                                                 
76
  Council of Australian Governments, ‘National Partnership Agreement on Energy Efficiency’  
(COAG, July 2009). 
77
  Council of Australian Governments, ‘ National Strategy on Energy Efficiency’ (COAG, July  
2009).  
78
  Building Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act 2010 (Cth)(passed June 2010, to commence in late  
2010), Part 2.  
79
  Building Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act 2010 (Cth), Part 3. 
80
  Ibid. 
81
  Building Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act 2010 (Cth), Part 1. 
82
  Ibid. 
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and the owner, (sub)lessor or (sub)lessee suffers damage as a result of that failure 
then damages for any loss suffered is able to be recovered from the assessor.83  
BEECs will be provided via the online Building Energy Efficiency Register and 
will be valid for no more than twelve months.
84
   
In addition to Commonwealth developments, disclosure has been required for 
residential properties in some Australian States and Territories. For example, in the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), it was made mandatory for vendors to disclose 
the current level of energy performance of a dwelling prior to sale. All advertisements 
for the sale of premises are required to contain a statement of the energy efficiency 
rating (EER) of the habitable part of the premises.
85
 Failure to include such a 
statement is a strict liability offence.86 A person also commits a strict liability offence 
if the EER is false or misleading in a material particular.87 The vendor is required to 
supply the prospective buyer with a copy of the EER before entering into a contract 
for the sale of the premises and the buyer is required to certify in writing that the EER 
has been received.
88
  If this fails to occur then the seller is liable to pay the buyer an 
amount equal to 0.5 per cent of the purchase price of the premises.89  
Most Australian jurisdictions have also implemented schemes to encourage or 
mandate the uptake of energy efficiency measures in Australian households through 
the electricity sector.90 There is significant variation throughout those schemes in 
terms of the quantity of the energy efficiency target imposed, the point of obligation, 
the means by which those targets may be achieved, and the status of instruments 
created by those schemes.  
 Energy efficiency has also been promoted in Australian households through 
governmental subsidies and payments at local, State and Federal levels. The Coalition 
                                                 
83
  Building Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act 2010 (Cth), Part 2. 
84
  Building Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act 2010 (Cth), Part 2. 
85
  Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT), Part 3. 
86
  Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT), Part 3. 
87
  Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT), Part 3. 
88
  Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT), Part 3. 
89
  Civil Law (Sale of Residential Property) Act 2003 (ACT), Part 3. 
90
  See, for example, the Victorian Energy Efficiency Target (VEET), the SA Residential Energy  
Efficiency Scheme (REES) and the NSW Energy Savings Scheme (ESS). 
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intends to use its Emissions Reduction Fund to incentivise energy efficiency along 
with other complementary measures.91 However, experience in Australia has 
demonstrated the importance of ensuring that these schemes are implemented with 
appropriate regulatory oversight including proper supervision of processes for the 
selection, accreditation and training of installers as well as processes for the 
verification of completed works. Australian experience to-date has highlighted the 
risks involved in the accelerated introduction of these schemes, without a properly 
resourced administrative framework, resulting in fraud and/or the negligent 
installation of efficiency measures. This is best illustrated through the problems 
experienced by the Rudd Government’s Green Loans scheme and Home Insulation 
package, both of which have been the subject of independent Parliamentary inquiries. 
The Green Loans Program provided Home Sustainability Assessments and access to 
small Green Loans, interest free for up to four years, to make the changes 
recommended in those assessments.
92
 The Homes Insulation Scheme provided rebates 
direct to contractors for the installation of foil insulation in the ceilings of residential 
houses.
93
 Inquiries into these schemes related to issues regarding the credibility of the 
contracts and procurement processes, processes for appointment and accreditation of 
contractors and, in the case of foil ceiling insulation, regrettable instances of house 
fires and the electrocution and deaths of untrained installers.
94
 These concerns have 
all acted to undermine the environmental credibility of these schemes and resulted in 
a loss of public confidence in the safety and effectiveness of these initiatives. Indeed, 
in the case of the Home Insulation Scheme, the scheme has since ceased and the 
Department is now undertaking the removal of foil insulation panels from high risk 
houses. 
 
                                                 
91
  The Australian Coalition, ‘Direct Action Plan on the Environment and Climate Change’ 2010. 
92
  Australian Government, Department of Environment ‘ Green Loans’  
<http://www.environment.gov.au/greenloans/index.html>. 
93
  Australian Government, Department of Environment ‘Homes Insulation Package’  
<http://www.environment.gov.au/energyefficiency/index.html>. 
94
  Alexander C,’ Metal insulation banned amid deaths’ AAP, 9 February 2010  
<http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/metal-insulation-banned-amid-deaths/story-e6frfku0-
1225828459921>. Berkovic N, ‘Garrett's $50m roofing debacle’, The Australian, 11 February 
2010 < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/garretts-50m-roofing-debacle/story-e6frg6n6-
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6. Promotion of Biological Sequestration Activities in Australia 
 
In addition to economic instruments aimed at incentivising emission reductions, and 
targeted measures to promote energy efficiencies and the uptake of renewable energy 
sources, there is also the possibility of implementing sequestration projects to offset 
gross emissions resulting in net emission reductions for Australia. Such measures are 
not directed at achieving changes in actual emitting behaviours rather they are seen as 
an important transitionary measure to assist in the reduction in atmospheric 
concentrations of emissions as we move towards a lower carbon society.  
The Earth has a number of natural stocks which are able to absorb carbon 
including the terrestrial system; rocks, sediments, wetlands, forests, soils, grasslands 
and other vegetation.95 Additional planting may increase the uptake of carbon as 
forests and vegetation absorb atmospheric carbon, through a process of 
photosynthesis, into plants, roots and soil. Changes in land use management may also 
increase the level of carbon sequestered in soils through improved degradation and 
erosion controls, conservation tillage, improved fertilisation, biochar, and forage 
rotations.96  It is important to note that, unlike actual emission reductions, these 
indirect reductions are both a temporary measure and dependant on stringent 
mechanisms to require that carbon stocks are maintained over longer time-scales. 
There are significant risks involved in maintaining these stocks as they may be lost as 
a result of storms, floods, bushfire and disease.  
The implementation of these projects may be voluntary or driven by a 
combination of future legal restrictions as well as government incentives to facilitate 
forest, vegetation and soil sequestration on land. Where recognised under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the sequestrations will assist Australia in meeting its emission reduction 
duties under the international climate change regime. It could also result in the 
creation of tradeable emission instruments under the international regime or under a 
future voluntary or regulatory carbon trading scheme in Australia. Such crediting 
                                                 
95
  Dumanski J, von Grebmer K and Pieri CJ, 'Opportunities in Agriculture and Forestry to Mitigate  
Greenhouse; Results of a Scientific Consultation' (St Michaels, 1998) at 2. 
96
  Ibid, 2-3. 
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raises a number of significant legal issues regarding the achievement of sequestration 
beyond business as usual practices (additionality), the demonstration of permanence 
of reductions, and possible legal interactions between the different forms of carbon 
rights and carbon instruments created across the Australian and international 
jurisdictions.  
 
6.1 Treatment of Reforestation Projects 
 
It is useful to look at the Labor Government’s suggested approach to biological 
sequestration under the proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).
97
 The 
Federal Government proposed to allow forest landholders to ‘opt in’ their 
reforestation activities under the CPRS. The Government adopted a definition of 
reforestation project broader than that of the Kyoto Protocol, to include projects for 
the establishment, management and maintenance, or management and maintenance 
only, of one or more forest stands on land that was clear of trees on 31 December 
1989. Management includes both the harvesting and re-establishment of the forest 
stand.  
Provided that the reforestation activity results in net sequestration, permanent 
permits will be issued to the project developer. However, where emissions from the 
activity exceed the level of sequestered carbon, the project developer will be a liable 
entity required to surrender permits for those emissions. This was an unusual decision 
to include reforestation as a liable entity within the CPRS, with free credits, rather 
than developing a separate tailored scheme for the generation and verification of 
offsets from this sector. In doing so, the Government deliberately sought to avoid the 
administrative issues associated with ensuring that offsets were additional and 
permanently maintained. As it noted: 
the Garnaut Review suggests that reforestation be eligible to generate offset credits.This …  would 
involve additional compliance costs for both industry and government … because of the need to 
demonstrate that forest carbon meets international offset standards, namely that it will be 
permanently maintained and is additional to business as usual.
98
  
                                                 
97
  These provisions are set out in Part 10 of the CPRS Bills Package (2010). 
98
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In order to be declared as an eligible reforestation project, the applicant is 
required to hold the carbon sequestration right in relation to the project. A recognised 
carbon sequestration right is defined as the exclusive legal right to obtain the benefit 
(whether present or future) of sequestration of carbon dioxide by trees on an area of 
land which was part of a reforestation project. If the right relates to an area of Torrens 
system land, the right is required to be registered or noted on the certificate of title 
and be an estate or interest in land, or otherwise have the effect of running with the 
land. The Federal Government does not propose to create these critical carbon 
sequestration rights but intends to rely on the creation and operation of these rights 
through State and Territory property and forestry regimes. Many Australian 
jurisdictions recognise the right to own carbon sequestered in the trees and vegetation 
on land separate from the rights relating to the land itself.  However, there is no 
unified approach to these rights and the legislative treatment varies drastically across 
the various jurisdictions.99  Indeed, the Government itself acknowledged that many, if 
not all, of these regimes would not comply with the definition set by the 
Commonwealth.100   
The CPRS takes a very different approach to forest projects from that adopted 
under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.101 Permanent 
Australian Emissions Units (AEUs) would be issued freely under the CPRS according 
to the reforestation unit limit determined by the Authority for the project minus the 
net total number of tonnes of greenhouse gases that, under the regulations, is taken to 
be removed by the forest stand.102 This directly conflicts with the principles adopted 
under the Kyoto Protocol in its treatment of Clean Development Mechanism forest 
projects where only temporary credits are issued for these temporary forest 
sequestrations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Green Paper (Canberra, 2008) p 127. 
99
  For a discussion of these issues see Durrant N, ‘Legal Issues in Biosequestration: Carbon Sinks,  
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100
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at 6.50.  
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  Under the Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.  
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Under the CPRS, AEUs would be required to be relinquished where there was a 
shortfall in the reported amount of sequestered carbon stock. The reforestation 
reporting period would be nominated by the project manager and be a period of not 
more than 5 years and not less than 12 months. If a person fails to relinquish emission 
units then the area could be declared subject to a forest maintenance obligation. The 
Authority could also issue a forest restoration order to require the person, to the 
extent to which the person was capable of doing so, of establishing and/or managing 
and maintaining one or more forest stands. The forest restoration order would remain 
in place until such time as the forest maintenance obligation declaration remained in 
force.  Unless revoked following relinquishment of AEUs, the declaration would 
continue in force until the penalty payable in respect of the non-compliance was paid 
in full or at the end of 100 years after the first occasion on which an AEU was issued 
in relation to the project.103 
The Coalition does not approve of the ‘system of quasi property rights’ created by 
the CPRS.104 Instead, it intends to use its Emissions Reduction Fund to directly fund 
abatement including tree planting and forestry measures.105 It also intends to establish 
a ‘Green Army’ of individuals tasked with planting 20 million trees by 2020 in urban 
and regional corridors.106 The Coalition has not addressed how it intends to ensure that 
these emissions abatements are maintained in the longer term. 
 
6.2 Treatment of Agriculture Activities 
 
The Kyoto Protocol enables nation States to elect to account for the changes in 
emissions and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities (LULUCF) including revegetation; forest management; 
                                                 
103
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relinquished by the prescribed amount. The penalty could be 200 per cent of the benchmark  
average auction price for the previous financial year. 
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cropland management and grazing land management.
107
 However, if the Federal 
Government elects to opt in these activities it is required to continue to account for all 
reductions and emissions from these areas in the first, and possibly subsequent, 
commitment period(s). Consequently, the Federal Government has previously 
indicated that it does not intend to utilise Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol.
108
  This 
was based on concerns about unpredictable fluctuations in carbon stocks from our 
variable climate as a result of temperature and soil moisture variability and risks of 
droughts and bushfire.
109
 Climate, including soil temperature and water availability, 
will influence the amount of carbon able to be stored in our soils and the higher 
temperatures experienced in Australia will generally result in lower levels of organic 
carbon storage compared to other countries. 
As a result of these concerns, the agriculture sector was initially excluded from 
being a ‘liable entity’ under the CPRS. However, the Federal Government faced 
ongoing lobbying from the Australian agriculture sector which believes that it is 
being excluded from the potential profits of providing sequestration credits to the 
national and international carbon trading market. In response to this lobbying, the 
Gillard Government undertook to create a so-called Carbon Farming Initiative to 
enable landholders to sell carbon credits on domestic and international markets.110 
Eligible projects would include legacy waste emissions from landfill sites, manure 
management in intensive livestock production and, potentially, savanna fire 
management by indigenous landholders, avoided methane emissions from fertiliser 
management and avoided deforestation.111 Further research regarding methodologies 
for soil carbon, including the controversial use of biochar, were also announced.  
Despite the variability of soil carbon, the Coalition maintains that soil carbon is, 
‘the lowest cost C02 emissions reduction available in Australia on a large scale’, and 
has committed to the purchase of large volumes of abatement from landholders using 
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its Emissions Reduction Fund.112 Once again, it has not addressed the crucial issue of 
maintaining Australia’s emissions abatement in the longer term. Its policy also 
assumes that soil carbon will be included in any future international climate change 
agreement.113 
 
7. Promotion of Geological Sequestration in Australia 
 
As a transitionary measure, geological sequestration (or carbon capture and storage 
(CCS)) is presented as an integral component of the portfolio of measures required to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions internationally and within Australia.
114
 Geological 
sequestration envisages the capture of greenhouse gas emissions at their point of 
source from fossil-fuel based electricity generation plants, biomass and gas power 
plants and other emissions-intensive industrial sectors.
115
 Those captured gases are 
then processed and transported to suitable storage sites. They are then injected and 
stored indefinitely in the Earth’s geological foundations such as deep sea-beds and 
subterranean formations.
116
 
Australia has seen an increasing move towards government policies of ‘no 
approval’ of new coal-fired power plants without such design and location to render 
them carbon capture ready.
117
 Such readiness requires CCS technology to be available 
for commercial deployment. It also requires an appropriate, supportive, regulatory 
environment designed to ensure the safe and permanent storage of these greenhouse 
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gas streams. Most jurisdictions in Australia have passed legislation for the regulation 
and implementation of carbon-based products in onshore underground storage areas.118 
The Commonwealth also established a regime for offshore storage in the area 
between the three nautical mile mark from the coastline to the outer limits of the 
continental shelf.
119
 Victoria recently implemented its own offshore regime for the 
Victorian offshore area up to the three nautical mile mark.
120
 These regimes all adopt 
different approval requirements and definitions including in relation to suitable site 
selection, responses to ‘risk’ and ‘serious situations’ and determinations as to whether 
the substance is ‘behaving as predicted’.  The long term liabilities of operators also 
receive very different treatment depending upon the jurisdiction of the project. Given 
the likelihood of stored substances migrating across Australia’s territorial boundaries, 
this approach does not come highly recommended. 121  
 
8. Concluding Comments 
 
Over the years, the Australian Federal Government has repeatedly confirmed its 
commitment to reducing Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with its 
allocated target under the Kyoto Protocol. Accordingly, in analysing the legal 
response to climate change in Australia one would expect to encounter some form of 
regulatory duty to restrict emissions, with associated liability provisions, and some 
semblance of a functional carbon pricing mechanism. This is not to be the case. The 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in Australia has been characterised by the 
conspicuous absence of effective legal approaches to restrict emissions. Blame for 
this can be directed at the pervading political resistance to the creation of legal 
measures which might undermine Australia’s economic growth and competitiveness. 
However, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions are still rising. By 2020, without the 
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introduction of new measures, Australia’s emissions are projected to be 120 per cent 
of 2000 levels.
122
  
Should a market approach be accepted in Australia then it will become critical for 
our carbon trading scheme to be designed to operate within an optimal legal 
framework. It is also clear that the use of market incentives alone is unlikely to be 
sufficient to achieve the substantial, and abrupt, emissions reductions now required. It 
appears that a portfolio of integrated legal responses will be necessary including 
direct regulation with strict duties to reduce emissions; optimal economic measures to 
place a price on carbon; and complementary measures to promote energy efficiency 
and the uptake of renewable energy sources as well as the managed sequestration of 
carbon through biological and geological storage.123  From a legal perspective, there is 
plenty of work to be done.  
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